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THE LODESTAR RANGER:
CALCULATING ATTORNEYS’ FEE
AWARDS IN PERDUE v. KENNY A.
REBECCA FRIEDMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Perdue v. Kenny A. presents a unique opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify whether fees awarded pursuant to a federal
fee-shifting statute may ever be enhanced on the basis of the quality
of performance and results obtained by the winning litigants’ attor2
neys. Over twenty-five years ago, Justice Brennan decried the loss of
the “straightforward command [of federal fee-shifting statutes to] . . .
a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, . . . which like a Frankenstein’s monster meanders its well-intentioned way through the legal
3
landscape leaving waste and confusion . . . in its wake.” The lack of
uniformity and clarity among the courts regarding what are permissible considerations when determining a “reasonable attorney’s fee”
demonstrates the significant impact the Supreme Court’s intervention
could have in taming “Frankenstein’s monster” for good.
Calculation of attorneys’ fees under federal fee-shifting statutes
has relied heavily upon the “lodestar” method, which multiplies hours
worked by an hourly rate subject to various enhancements and ad4
justments. In Perdue, the Supreme Court will necessarily address two
2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. argued Oct. 14, 2009).
2. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Jan.
29, 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009) (setting out a question presented that asks if a
“reasonable attorney’s fee award . . . [can] ever be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results obtained when these factors already are included in the lodestar calculation”) (emphasis added), with Brief in Opposition at i, Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 2009) (setting out a question presented that asks if the “District Court abuse[s] its discretion in awarding an upward adjustment of the initial lodestar fee, based upon specific record
findings of superior performance and exceptional success”).
3. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 455 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. The term “‘lodestar’ stems from the figure’s role as ‘the guiding light of [the Court’s]
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related issues concerning the lodestar, and perhaps consider a third.
First, the Court will consider what factors are properly included in the
determination of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under the Civil Rights
5
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (“section 1988”), the federal feeshifting statute. Second, the Court will address whether the current
method for calculating fees appropriately accounts for these factors.
Third, the Court may decide to consider whether a wholesale departure from the traditional approach in calculating fees might better reflect section 1988’s goal of providing reasonable fees to winning litigants.
This term, the Supreme Court will hear “an unprecedented number of cases addressing fundamental aspects of professional responsi6
bility and regulation of the legal profession.” As one of those cases,
Perdue has the potential to alter an aspect of practice that not only
resonates personally with all practicing attorneys, but could also provide the impetus for the entire legal community to address, head-on,
the changing market for its services.
“Perdue arose out of Georgia’s dysfunctional foster care system”
and culminated in major substantive reforms intended to eliminate
7
the system’s biggest problems. The district court awarded the winning
litigants’ attorneys $6 million plus a seventy-five percent enhancement for their services. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s
award and enhancement not because it believed such an award was
8
merited, but because it was constrained by precedent. In reviewing
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court will likely confee-shifting jurisprudence.” Case Comment, Attorneys’ Fees—Fee Enhancement, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 339 n.13 (1992) (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)).
5. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000)
(granting a court, in its discretion, the authority to permit the prevailing party to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”).
6. Renee Newman Knake, Prioritizing Professional Responsibility and the Legal Profession: A Preview of the United States Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2009) (discussing seven cases the Court had already agreed to hear
regarding the “role of attorneys and the practice of law”).
7. Scott Street, Perdue v. Kenny A.: Is the “Lodestar” Approach Adequate for Calculating
Attorney’s Fees? (Argument Recap), SCOTUS WIKI, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.scotuswiki.com/
index.php?title=Perdue_v._Kenny_A.
8. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008). All three judges on the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The majority opinion represents the views of
Judge Carnes and Judge Hill except with respect to Part VI in which Judge Hill did not concur.
The majority affirmed the district court’s decision because of the “prior precedent rule,” which,
it stated, necessitated its affirmation despite the fact that the district court’s enhancement could
not “be squared with [] Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 1225. Judge Wilson, writing the minority opinion, found the district court’s decision legally and judicially sound. Id. at 1242 (Wilson,
J., concurring).
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strue prior Court rulings to find that the district court’s fee enhancement was improper and that public policy concerns regarding exorbitant fee enhancements necessitate vacating the award. This Comment
argues, however, that there are sound reasons to hold the enhancement was justified and that relevant market considerations support
affirming the district court’s decision.
II. FACTS
What began as an effort to improve the quality of life for thousands of children in Georgia’s foster care system now ends as a battle
over how much to pay attorneys in Perdue v. Kenny A. In Perdue, nine
foster children in the custody of the Georgia Department of Human
Resources (DHR) sued the Governor of Georgia, DHR, and others
on behalf of themselves and 3,000 foster children within two Georgia
9
counties. The plaintiffs alleged fifteen causes of action under state
and federal law as a result of “systematic deficiencies” in the State
10
foster care system. The federal claims, alleged pursuant to 42
11
U.S.C.A. § 1983, were for violations of the “class members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process
and their First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty,
12
privacy, and association.”
The case, which officially began in 2002, came to a head in 2005
when the district court recommended that the parties attend media13
tion in an effort to address the plaintiffs’ complaints. After four
months and more than 110 hours spent in eighteen separate media14
tion sessions, the parties settled. The settlement included thirty-one
9. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1214–15. The other defendants are the commissioners of DHR,
Fulton and DeKalb Counties, and the counties’ respective departments and directors of family
and children services.
10. Id. at 1215. Alleged deficiencies included: “(1) assigning excessive numbers of cases to
inadequately trained and poorly supervised caseworkers; (2) not developing a sufficient number
of foster homes properly screened to ensure the plaintiff children’s safety; and (3) not identifying adult relatives who could care for the plaintiff children as an alternative to strangers or impersonal institutions,” among other problems. Id.
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996) (providing the substantive right under which a winning litigant may then pursue recovery for their attorneys’ fees under section 1988).
12. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1215. The plaintiffs also alleged state claims such as violations of
their “substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Georgia Constitution,” and
other State statutes. Id. To remedy these allegations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The plaintiff class and Fulton and DeKalb counties settled in 2006; their agreement
is not on appeal. Id. at 1216. The defendants involved in this settlement, and the case before the
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substantive and procedural remedies to the State’s foster care system,
as well as recovery for the expenses of litigation and reasonable at15
torneys’ fees and costs for the plaintiffs. Despite the defendants’ acknowledgement that they would bear the costs of counsel, the parties
were unable to agree on “reasonable fees,” and consequently filed
16
with the district court for an awards determination.
The plaintiffs’ attorneys requested approximately $14.2 million in
fees—$7.1 million for the 30,000 hours allegedly spent working on the
17
case (the lodestar) plus another $7.1 million as an enhancement for
“achiev[ing] exceptional results vindicating the constitutional and
18
statutory rights of thousands of children of a classwide basis.” The
defendants objected to both the lodestar figure and the enhancement,
arguing that the plaintiffs’ attorneys overbilled and provided records
19
“too vague to support a claim for compensation.” The defendants
also alleged that an enhanced fee would result in double-counting because “the skill of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in litigating the case [was
20
already] taken into account in setting their hourly rates.”
The district court awarded a total of $10.5 million to the winning
21
litigants—a $6 million fee award and a $4.5 million enhancement.
The court arrived at the $6 million fee by “granting in full each hourly
rate requested,” then reducing the number of hours reportedly spent
on non-travel related matters by fifteen percent, and halving the
22
hourly rates for time spent traveling. The district court then enhanced the lodestar award by seventy-five percent because it decided
that this award did not fully cover class counsels’ $1.7 million advancement for expenses, their lack of payment on an on-going basis,
Supreme Court, are the governor of Georgia, Department of Human Resources for the state of
Georgia (DHR), DHR’s commissioner, Fulton and DeKalb County’s Department of Family
and Children Services, and the respective directors of those departments. Id.
15. Id. These fees were shifted to the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 and FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(h).
16. Id. at 1217.
17. Id. The exact amount the plaintiffs’ attorneys sought was a total of $14,342,860—
$7,171,434.30 in compensation for the 29,908.73 hours they (and their paralegals) claimed to
have worked plus $7,171,434.30 as an enhancement.
18. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Award Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses of Litigation at 3,
Kenny A. v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-01686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2005).
19. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1217.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1217–18. The exact amounts are $6,012,802.90 for the basic fee award and
$4,509,602.00 as an enhancement, totaling $10,522,405.08. The district court reduced the requested lodestar by fifteen percent (or $1,158,631.40) because it found some billing entries too
vague or excessive. Id. at 1217.
22. Id. at 1218.
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and the “completely contingent” nature of recovery in the case. Further, the court “found that ‘the superb quality of [counsels’] representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the stan24
dard hourly rates used to calculate the [fee]’.”
The Eleventh Circuit, despite expressing an unwillingness to sup25
port the fee enhancement and the lodestar award, affirmed in full
26
27
the district court’s decision. If not for controlling precedent, the
28
Eleventh Circuit majority stated, it would have reversed. What now
remains before the Supreme Court is to decide whether the quality of
representation and results obtained are fully accounted for in the
lodestar, and if they are not, if enhancement based upon these factors
29
is proper.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under the American Rule, “the prevailing party may not recover
30
attorneys’ fees as costs or otherwise.” A losing litigant, however, will
pay the winning litigant’s attorneys’ fees if the action falls under one
of the many statutory exceptions to the American Rule authorized by
31
Congress. If the Court decides to redefine what constitutes reason23. Id. (quoting Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 454 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1288 (N.D. Ga.
2005)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1220.
26. Id. at 1236–37 (“Unfortunately, under the prior panel precedent rule we are not free to
decide the enhancement issue, but must instead follow this Court’s earlier decisions . . . .”). The
Eleventh Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal. The plaintiffs have not sought further review.
27. See NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding a fee award
may be enhanced in some cases); Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988)
(remanding in part because the court failed to consider whether an upward adjustment to the
lodestar was merited).
28. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1238 (“[A]s a later panel we are bound to follow [prior Eleventh
Circuit decisions].”).
29. Id. at 1219–20. The defendants also claimed that the district court should not have
compensated the plaintiffs’ lawyers for all claimed photocopying expenses and that they were
compensated for an unreasonable number of hours. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s ruling with regard to these claims as well.
30. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (affirming the
rule that parties should bear the costs of their own representation and that only Congress, not
the courts, may authorize exceptions to this rule); see Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees
Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L. J. 435, 435 (citing Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796), as the birthplace of the American Rule). The American Rule is an
unusual feature of American civil litigation. “Most other countries with comp[a]rable litigation
systems use some form of fee shifting.” Id. at 435, n.1.
31. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 913
(3d ed. 2002) (“More than 180 federal statutes and 4,000 state statutes authorize awards of at-
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able attorneys’ fees under one of the fee-shifting statutes, then all
32
other fee-shifting statutes will be reinterpreted accordingly. One
such fee-shifting statute—and the statute at issue—is the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (“section 1988”). Under section
1988(b), a court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” incurred in a federal
33
civil rights action.
Awarding a reasonable fee under the federal fee-shifting statutes
34
is a two-step process: (1) determine the “number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
35
rate,” and (2) consider whether an upward or downward adjustment
36
is merited. Beyond showing a general unwillingness to enhance attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court has never explicitly precluded courts
37
from engaging in this process. Supreme Court precedent provides for
courts, “in [their] discretion,” to adjust attorneys’ fees so that they
38
may in fact be “reasonable” under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. It is less clear
whether this precedent permits the courts to adjust fees based on factors that may already be considered by some to be sufficiently accounted for in the initial fee calculation.
“Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision of section 1988 to
encourage lawyers to accept representations in meritorious civil rights
torneys’ fees.”). Other statutory exceptions to the American Rule include the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(b) and (d); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(k); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(b), 7604(d), 7607(f), 7622(b)(2)(B); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2060(c) and (f), 2072(a), 2073; Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
1640(a)(3), and others. Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11,
Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. June 29, 2009).
32. Case Comment, supra note 4, at 338 n.3 (“The Supreme Court has noted that the generally similar wording among fee-shifting statutes is a ‘strong presumption that they are to be interpreted alike’.” (citing Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989)
(internal citation omitted)); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (finding
“[t]he legislative history of § 1988 indicates that Congress intended that ‘the standards for
awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act’.
The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress
has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party’.”).
33. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000).
34. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478
U.S. 546 (1986).
35. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
36. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984) (addressing the “remaining” issue in the
case—whether it is appropriate to adjust the fee); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (furthering
the point that the “product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry”).
37. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 (rejecting petitioner’s argument that “an upward adjustment
to an attorney’s fee is never appropriate under § 1988.”).
38. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976).
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cases.” Recognizing that many civil rights litigants are people who
40
have “little or no money with which to hire a lawyer,” Congress
sought to provide the monetary incentive necessary to attract compe41
tent counsel. Thus, fees awarded under the federal fee-shifting statutes are supposed to be guided “by the same standards which prevail
in other types of equally complex Federal litigation . . . and not [to] be
reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in na42
ture.”
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has addressed a variety of factors that should and should not be considered when determining a “reasonable fee” under fee-shifting statutes. The Supreme
43
Court first addressed the issue in Hensley v. Eckerhart. In Hensley,
the Court held that “the most useful starting point for determining
the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably ex44
pended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” The
Court noted that “other factors,” as enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia
45
Highway Express, Inc., might also be considered in determining a
reasonable fee, but these other factors were likely already accounted
46
for in the lodestar calculation.
The Supreme Court gradually narrowed the spectrum of appropriate justifications for attorneys’ fees enhancements over the years,
finding many already accounted for in the lodestar calculation. For in39. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2009).
40. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 6.
41. Case Comment, supra note 4, at 338; see William R. Mureiko, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees Under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L. J.
438, 440 (“[T]he general purpose of fee-shifting statutes [is] to provide for complete enforcement of rights Congress has deemed worthy of special protection.”).
42. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 6.
43. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986) (noting “[w]e first addressed the question of the proper manner in which to determine a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee in
Hensley v. Eckerhart”).
44. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
45. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Hensley, 461 U.S., at 434 n.9. There are twelve factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc. that a court should consider in making an awards determination. 488 F.2d
714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors are: “time and labor required;” “novelty and difficulty
of the questions;” “skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;” “preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;” “customary fee;” “whether the fee
is fixed or contingent;” “time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;” “amount
involved and the results obtained;” “experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;” “‘undesirability’ of the case;” “nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;”
and “awards in similar cases.” Id.
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47

stance, in Blum v. Stenson, the Court held that the “novelty and
complexity of the issues” were already accounted for in the lodestar
48
and therefore should not merit a fee enhancement. The Blum Court
further limited the scope of permissible reasons for enhancing attorneys’ fees when it denied an enhancement based on the contingent
49
nature of success in the case at issue. The Court, nonetheless, expressly noted that an upward adjustment of attorneys’ fees might be
50
appropriate in “certain ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases.” Likewise, in
51
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, the
Court held that a generalized determination that counsel’s performance was of “superior quality” was insufficient to justify enhancement
52
without “specific evidence” supporting this determination, but did
not find enhancements to be wholly inconsistent with the award of
53
reasonable fees under federal fee-shifting statutes.
54
In NAACP v. City of Evergreen, the Eleventh Circuit confronted
the specific question of whether enhancements could be justified
based on results achieved in a particular case. The court held that although the extent of results obtained by particular litigation usually
does not merit an enhancement, one might be justified if the case was

47. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). In Blum, the district court granted the lodestar
plus a fifty percent enhancement to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a civil rights action. The Supreme
Court reversed the enhancement.
48. Id. at 898–99.
49. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). This issue was addressed earlier
in the plurality opinion of Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II), 483 U.S. 711 (1987), which held that multipliers for assuming the risk of loss was
an impermissible consideration for adjusting an attorney’s fee.
50. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478
U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (citing to Blum and addressing the limited circumstances in which upward
adjustments are permissible).
51. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478
U.S. 546 (1986). Although Delaware Valley I was brought under section 304(d) of the Clean Air
Act, the Court explained that the purposes behind this Act and section 1988 are “nearly identical.” Id. at 559.
52. Id. at 566 (noting that the quality of the winning litigants’ counsels’ representation is
normally reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, and that to adjust the lodestar based on this
could result in double counting). The Court did not state that enhancements were always inappropriate, but, in dicta, criticized both the district court and court of appeals for failing to provide specific findings as to why the lodestar was insufficient.
53. See Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 728 (addressing the decision to enhance based on
the risk of nonpayment and finding that enhancement for such risk “should be reserved for exceptional cases”). Although the Court in City of Burlington v. Dague overruled Delaware Valley
II to the extent that the lower court’s enhancement was based on the contingent nature of a
case, the Court still did not render a final judgment on whether enhancements are wholly impermissible.
54. NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987).
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an “exceptional success.” Within a year, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to enhancements in Norman v. Housing Au56
thority, noting that if the “results obtained were exceptional, then
57
some enhancement of the lodestar might be called for.”
Because one of the responsibilities of the Supreme Court is to establish uniform application of federal law by the lower federal courts,
the Court may find that Perdue provides the ideal framework to identify precisely what factors go into the calculation of attorneys’ fees
awarded under fee-shifting statutes. The Court, however, may decide
to wholly eliminate fee enhancements, finding them beyond the scope
of a “reasonable” fee, or it may seek to establish an entirely new
methodology for determining awards under section 1988.
IV. HOLDING
58

Bound by its prior precedents, the Eleventh Circuit begrudgingly
59
affirmed the district court’s fee enhancement to the winning liti-

55. Id. at 1337. In NAACP the Eleventh Circuit remanded because the district court failed
to properly consider whether in fact an enhancement of the lodestar was justified. It ruled that
the district court should “make findings with regard to each of the grounds put forward by the
[the winning litigants] as warranting an enhancement and relate those findings to its ultimate determination of the issue.” Id.
56. Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 1302. The Norman Court followed this comment by noting that even if results obtained are “exceptional,” no enhancement was justified unless the quality of “representation
was superior to that which one would reasonably expect . . . .” Id.
58. Under the “prior precedent rule, a panel decision is the law of the circuit unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court or the en banc court.” Gulf Power Co. v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, 226 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2000). See Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are not permitted to reach a result contrary to a prior panel’s decision merely
because we are convinced it is wrong . . . .”). The Eleventh Circuit cited NAACP v. City of Evergreen and Norman v. Housing Authority as binding precedents in this case. See NAACP, 812
F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding a fee award may be enhanced in some cases, but
was inappropriate in this instance because the district court failed to find that the relief obtained
was of great benefit “and represented exceptional success”); Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306 (remanding the case in part because the court “applied the wrong standard” and failed to consider
whether an adjustment to the lodestar was merited in light of the legal significance of the case).
Kenny A. v. Perdue was heard by three judges only, not the Eleventh Circuit en banc. 532 F.3d
1209 (11th Cir. 2008).
59. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1238. The court opined: “[f]or the reasons we have already explained at length, we are convinced [the NAACP and Norman holdings are] wrong and conflict[] with relevant Supreme Court decisions. Nonetheless, as a later panel we are bound to follow it.” Id. at 1238. The majority also decided not to remand the case because it considered doing so “pointless,” explaining “[t]he district court was so obviously enamored with the performance of plaintiffs’ counsel and . . . determined to reward them for it, that we have no doubt the
court would simply reinstate the enhancement . . . . All that a remand would achieve is more delay and the generation of more billable hours.” Id. at 1242.

DO NOT DELETE

7/20/2010 4:11:16 PM

THE LODESTAR RANGER

2009]

67

60

gants. Despite its affirmace, the majority of the Eleventh Circuit’s
three-judge panel rejected the district court’s rationale on three
grounds. First, the Eleventh Circuit regarded the Supreme Court’s
frequent emphasis on the “strong presumption” of the lodestar’s rea61
sonableness as meriting a reversal of the fee enhancement. It emphasized the Court’s discussion of the “rare” and “exceptional” nature
of a case that merits an enhancement, and concluded that affirming
the adjustment here would cut against that core aspect of such fee de62
terminations. Second, the appeals court rejected each of the district
court’s reasons for enhancing the award—the advancement of case
63
64
expenses, delayed payment, and the contingent nature of the
65
case —as either in conflict with Supreme Court precedent or already
66
fully reflected in the lodestar award. Third, the appeals court condemned the enhancement insofar as it compensated plaintiffs’ counsel
67
for obtaining a result that went beyond a favorable ruling. The purpose of fee-shifting statutes, the court explained, is not to “dazzle[] or
bedazzle[] the district judge,” but simply to provide “adequate repre68
sentation.”
Concurring in the judgment only, Judge Wilson argued that Eleventh Circuit case law regarding upward adjustments of the lodestar
was consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and that the enhance69
ment here was authorized. Citing Blum, the concurring opinion concluded that an enhancement of the lodestar was permissible insofar as
60. Id. at 1236. The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the award of photocopying copying expenses and the basic lodestar award. Id. at 1219–20.
61. See id. at 1223 (concluding that the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act was designed only to provide a “reasonable fee,” not “to improve the financial lot of attorneys”).
62. Id. at 1227 (addressing that attorneys “almost always” have to advance expenses and
deal with delays in reimbursement, thus awarding attorneys enhanced fees based on this would
not support the Supreme Court’s presumption against enhancements).
63. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that advancement of case expenses and delay in
payments under section 1983 actions are “simply the nature of the beast,” and rewarding the
winning litigants based on these two considerations would eliminate the “exceptional” nature of
lodestar adjustments.
64. Id. (stating that “any delays in payment for professional services rendered is offset by
the fact that the hourly rates used are those that prevail at the completion of the case instead of”
at the time the work was done).
65. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1228 (addressing Dague’s holding that enhancements based on
the contingent nature of a case are “flatly forbidden”). See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505
U.S. 557, 565 (1992) (barring enhancements based on contingency).
66. Id. at 1223, 1225.
67. Id. at 1230. The Eleventh Circuit argued that awarding attorneys for “merit-exceeding
results” would incentivize attorneys to bring meritless claims, and therefore impose high social
costs.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1242 (Wilson, J., concurring).
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it was supported by specific evidence demonstrating that the quality
of legal representation went beyond what one would expect at the
70
given hourly rate. Cases that did not result in enhancements, the
concurring opinion explained, failed to supply specific evidence justifying such enhancements, and for that reason were properly re71
versed.
In Kenny A., the concurring opinion found the adjustment to be
appropriate because the district court provided detailed findings to
72
support its conclusion that the lodestar alone was inadequate. It also
noted that “the vindication of a constitutional right against a government institution” realized by this settlement created a public benefit
73
that further supported the enhancement. Thus, unlike the majority
opinion, the concurring opinion fully supported the district court’s decision to enhance the lodestar award insofar as the district court did
not find the unadjusted fee to be “reasonable.”
V. ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Circuit stated that it upheld the lower court’s decision despite its reservations because circuit precedent “control[led]
74
the outcome of this case,” and that if it remanded, only additional,
75
unnecessary delay would result. The court, however, should not have
affirmed with such regret. Case law and the fee-shifting statutes permit enhancements beyond that which attorneys receive in the basic
lodestar calculation on the basis of quality of representation and re70. Id. at 1242–43 (Wilson, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 1243–44 (Wilson, J., concurring) (“It was this lack of evidentiary support—rather
than a blanket rule against consideration of the quality of representation or the results obtained—that compelled reversal [in Delaware Valley I], as the Court repeatedly made clear.”);
see NAACP, 812 F.2d at 1336 (critiquing the lower court for its failure to explicitly state how its
“findings affected its determination regarding enhancement”); Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306 (also
critiquing the lower court for its failure to justify a decision not to enhance “with reference to
the extant substantive law”).
72. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1247 (Wilson, J., concurring). In assessing the district court’s ruling, Judge Wilson relied upon the district judge’s findings concerning the quality of service rendered, affidavits by four local attorneys discussing appropriate fee awards, the testimony of the
litigating attorneys, and the district judge’s personal observations of the attorneys’ performances.
73. Id. at 1251 (Wilson, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1242 (majority opinion).
75. Id. The majority noted that the tone of the district court’s opinion indicated that if the
case was remanded the initial decision would remain unchanged. The district court opinion
stated that the “plaintiff’s counsel brought a higher degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and
professionalism to this litigation than the Court has seen displayed by the attorneys in any other
case during its 27 years on the bench.” Id. at 1218. This comment was among other accolades the
district court bestowed upon the plaintiffs’ counsel.
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sults obtained. Moreover, public policy considerations demand enhancements of the lodestar. Since adjusted fee awards more accurately reflect today’s market rates, the possibility of fee enhancements
provides a means to attract competent counsel in accordance with
Congress’s goal in enacting section 1988.
A. A Lack of Categorical Bars
One of the majority’s main issues with the district court’s decision
was the district court’s enhancement of the lodestar by over $4 million
76
based on the “superb quality” of the attorneys’ representation. The
Eleventh Circuit found this action to be logically inconsistent with the
district court’s decision to also reduce the winning litigants’ requested
77
lodestar by more than $1 million. The Eleventh Circuit also noted
that there was a greater likelihood of double-counting when courts
considered the “quality of representation” in determining fees because this was a factor “presumably fully reflected in the lodestar
78
amount.”
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that fee enhancements are
categorically barred. Although the Court’s record reveals a proclivity
to strike enhancements, the lack of a blanket exclusion on enhancements and careful circumscription of the breadth of the Court’s prior
rulings to account for enhancements in rare circumstances suggest
79
that adjustments continue to be permissible. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has noted that a district court’s discretion to determine awards
under the fee-shifting statutes is part and parcel of determining a
80
“reasonable fee.”
76. Id. at 1228.
77. Id. at 1229 (stating that “bad and excessive billing,” which the plaintiffs’ attorneys
seemingly engaged in at least to the tune of $1 million, “is inconsistent with superb lawyering”).
78. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565 (noting that the skill, experience, quality of representation, and results obtained are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar, but not necessarily); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“The product of reasonable hours times a
reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the
district court to adjust the fee . . . including the important factor of the ‘results obtained’.”); see
also Brief for New York State Bar Assoc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9,
Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s decision not to categorically bar enhancements is a decision based on the lack of a need to do so because there is “no evidence [suggesting] that the limited availability of such fee enhancements
has led to the widespread ‘windfalls’”).
80. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983) (“It remains for the district court to determine what
fee is reasonable.”); Blanchard v. Bergerson, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (“It is central to the awarding of attorney’s fees under § 1988 that the district court judge, in his or her good judgment,

DO NOT DELETE

70

7/20/2010 4:11:16 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR[VOL. 5:59

Here, the district judge made a determination based on personal
observations of the proceedings and evaluations of the results ulti81
mately achieved. The district judge assessed the case in light of his
twenty-seven years on the bench and considered testimony from attorneys in the relevant legal market to determine whether an en82
hancement of the lodestar would reflect a “reasonable fee.” Although the Eleventh Circuit majority was highly critical of the district
83
judge’s reasoning, the district court did not make a decision that
crossed any line barring enhancements. Instead, a majority of the appellate court made a fact-intensive determination when its only
84
charge was to review the lower court for an abuse of discretion. The
concurrence, in contrast, duly noted that the district court’s determination was one in which it was entitled to reach and accordingly af85
firmed the judgment.
B. The Lodestar Two-Step
Two purposes in particular drove the enactment of the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976. First, section 1988 encourages people to bring the types of lawsuits that “vindicate [] important Congressional policies” covered by the fee-shifting stat86
utes —lawsuits that redress violations of people’s civil rights. Without
a statutory mechanism to ensure recovery of a reasonable attorney’s
fee, it would be economically infeasible for plaintiffs to bring such
87
cases. As Justice Brennan explained:
[I]t is highly unlikely that the prospect of a fee equal to a fraction of the damages respondents might recover [in civil rights
make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case.”).
81. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1249 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 1234–35 (majority opinion); id. at 1249 (Wilson, J., concurring). The district judge
noted that “[a]fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge, the Court is unaware of
any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable result on such a comprehensive scale.” Id. at 1251 (Wilson, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 1231–32 (majority opinion) (addressing, among other issues, its dissatisfaction
with the district court’s reliance on lawyer affidavits to support its awards determination). The
majority of the Eleventh Circuit argued that “the lawyers who signed the affidavits have a financial interest in keeping the fee award in this case and every case like it as high as possible”
and consequently their opinions did not provide useful, unbiased insight into whether the hourly
rate, without enhancement, was appropriate. Id.
84. Id. at 1218.
85. See id. at 1247–48 (Wilson, J., concurring) (“[I]t is the exclusive province of the judge in
non-jury trials to assess the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony.”
(quoting Childrey v. Bennett, 997 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1993))).
86. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976).
87. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 579 (1986).
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cases] would have been sufficient to attract competent counsel. Moreover, since counsel might not have found it economically feasible to expend the amount of time . . . necessary to
litigate the case properly, it is even less likely that counsel
would have achieved the excellent results . . . obtained here.
Thus, had respondents had to rely on private-sector fee arrangements, they might well have been unable to obtain redress for their grievances. It is precisely for this reason that
88
Congress enacted [section] 1988.
Second, Congress enacted section 1988 in an attempt to reflect the
full benefits these types of cases realize, which include a generalized
89
benefit to the public at large. Section 1988 recognizes that when attorneys undertake cases falling under the statute they are acting not
only for themselves “but also as [] ‘private attorney[s] general,’ vindi90
cating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”
Congress limited awards by incorporating the word “reasonable”
into the statute, but failed to clarify what comprises a “reasonable” fee
beyond what is “adequate to attract competent counsel without pro91
ducing windfalls to attorneys.” The Supreme Court’s efforts to resolve what factors are impermissible considerations when calculating
attorneys’ fees have done little to elucidate what are permissible considerations when determining fee awards under section 1988. Thus,
the district courts have been left to particularize what factors beyond
the basic lodestar calculation can and should be weighed in determining attorneys’ fees.
“Courts, Congress, and scholars all agree that if left to private enforcement, civil rights [would] likely be significantly under92
enforced.” By leaving what little room still remains for the district
88. Id. at 579–80 (footnote omitted).
89. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 3; see Mureiko, supra note 41, at 440 (describing attorney fee
shifting as “a mechanism to provide an important ‘public good’”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The
Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662 (noting that
adjustment is necessary because “[l]itigation sometimes produces benefits beyond those reaped
by the successful party”).
90. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3 (noting that to not award attorneys’ fees in these types of
cases “would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose”). The
Senate Report also stated that “Congress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most
effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil rights.” Id.
91. Id. at 6; see generally Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (explaining the extent to
which “reasonable” is defined by Congress with respect to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of § 1988 was to make sure that competent counsel was available to civil rights plaintiffs . . . .”).
92. Mureiko, supra note 41, at 455–56; see also Rowe, supra note 89, at 664 (“[W]hen a leg-
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courts to particularize fee awards with respect to the circumstances of
a specific case, the Supreme Court will preserve the incentive Congress recognized as necessary to keep lawyers interested in vindicat93
ing the public’s civil rights. The lodestar award, without the possibility of enhancement, does not provide this same incentive. This is
partly because the “trend in the marketplace is toward greater use of
94
performance- or result-based fee structures.” The basic lodestar calculation (hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) cannot account for this trend. Therefore, without the possibility of enhancements, “the potential remuneration [attorneys] can earn from
civil rights cases will be, on average, lower than what they can earn in
95
matters requiring comparable skill.” If the courts are to measure a
reasonable fee as that which “prevail[s] in other types of equally
96
complex Federal litigation,” but cannot provide a fee adjustment in
cases that would usually receive one, attorneys may be discouraged
from taking such cases, and the awards provided may ultimately re97
flect an unreasonable sum. By permitting courts to adjust fees when
it finds it necessary to do so lawyers are encouraged to take on cases
Congress has identified as of particular importance, and courts can
98
provide for fees more consistent with section 1988’s goals.
islature perceives a regular imbalance, it can seek to match adversaries more evenly by adopting
some form of fee-shifting to prevent disproportionate advantage in access to and use of the legal
process.”).
93. See Rowe, supra note 89, at 663–64 (noting that the “prospect of reimbursement” for
fees incurred during the course of litigation can “stiffen the resolve of the relatively weaker
side” . . . and “prevent disproportionate advantage in access to and use of the legal process”).
94. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 12.
95. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 13.
96. S. REP. 94-1011, at 6.
97. The lodestar may not in fact be a “reasonable” fee in light of the surrounding circumstances. See Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 1988) (remanding for the
district court to consider “the significance of the results obtained in relation to those sought”
when making its fee determination); see also Brief in Opposition, supra note 2, at 34 (“[U]pward
adjustment is only appropriate where the fee as initially calculated by the lodestar would otherwise be unreasonable, as it was found to be in this case.”). During oral arguments, Mr. Clement,
counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents, highlighted this point when he stated “the lodestar is not
a destination. It’s not a complete calculation. The lodestar is a guiding light.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 45, Perdue v. Kenny A., No. 08-970 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2009).
98. Justice Sotomayor commented to this effect, questioning the petitioner with regard to
whether counsel “better than the norm” would be as likely to take on cases covered by the feeshifting statutes and serve as private attorney generals if enhancements were impermissible.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 24. See Case Comment, supra note 4, at 343
(“fee-shifting statutes are designed” to encourage lawyers to “undertake public interest litigation” in the same way they would choose to do so in “claims for which they are paid up front”);
Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
281, 324–25 (1977) (“The experience of the marketplace indicates that lawyers generally will not
provide legal representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that
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C. Discretionary Awards and the Current State of the Legal Market
In a radical departure from how clients in the private sector expected to be billed in the past, clients today increasingly demand that
their attorneys bill on the basis of value rather than on the basis of
99
time spent on a particular matter. Consequently, an “overreliance on
100
billable hours ‘may not reflect value to the client’,” and therein may
not reflect market value either. Thus, if the Court is to respect both
the letter and spirit of section 1988, it will need to spend more time
addressing the changing nature of the legal market and less time worrying about whether enhancements will be awarded haphazardly.
The explicit purpose behind fee-shifting statutes is to “attract
competent counsel” with fee awards comparable to what “is tradi101
tional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client.” Before
Blum, most courts chose “an hourly rate in the abstract and then sub102
ject[ed] the fee to a multiplier to allow for individual factors.” After
Blum, the Supreme Court gradually found considerations that might
otherwise justify a fee enhancement or reduction already accounted
103
for in hourly rates. This shift was appropriate in light of clients’ in104
creasing preference for hourly-based billing during the 1970s. With
risk.”).
99. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 8.
100. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 9.
101. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 6. See also Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note
39, at 11–12 (“Lawyers, like other service providers, operate in an economic market . . . [and], as
a general matter . . . will accept a particular representation only if the lawyer expects to earn
fees that are at least equal to the fees he would earn if he accepted an alternative matter.”).
102. LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 922; Telephone Interview with Neil Williams, Managing
Partner 1984–96, Alston & Bird (Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing that in the earlier days of lawyering a
“reasonable fee” was discussed only after a matter closed, and then only in terms of the facts,
circumstances, and results achieved by counsel, not the number of hours spent). Thus, when
courts used to determine an award based on the value procured rather than hours spent multiplied by the hourly rate, judges were calculating awards in accordance with how the market
compensated attorneys at that time.
103. LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 922.
104. See Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 7. In 2009, THE
AMERICAN LAWYER published a number of articles addressing the gradually changing nature of
law firm billing practices in light of clients’ and general counsels’ demands for better costmanagement and high quality work product. See Brian Baxter, Cost Control More Important
AM.
LAWYER,
Nov.
4,
2009,
available
at
Than
Compliance,
THE
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202435168836 (reporting on a study by the
Association of Corporate Counsel, which found that in in-house counsels’ efforts to control the
costs of outside counsel the “use of alternative fee structures rose to sixty-one percent [by] inhouse counsel” although hourly billing rates still remained “the norm”); Ursula Furi-Perry,
Coupons Not Required: GCs Look for Creative Ways to Save on Legal Costs, GC MIDATLANTIC, July 6, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=
1202431987114&thepage=1 (reporting that the “biggest talk of the town at corporate law de-
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the economic downturn, however, the market for legal services is
changing once again, and the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees un105
der section 1988 ought reflect this. Should the Court decide not to
follow current market trends and further remove judicial involvement
from the determination of fee calculations, lawyers may be encouraged (or at least not discouraged) from “run[ning] the meter” in order
to increase their awards as determined by the traditional lodestar cal106
culation. This problem may be exacerbated because, in general, en107
hancements are awarded sparingly, yet, downward adjustments are
still widely regarded as part and parcel of the judiciary’s authority to
cut “hours spent unnecessarily or inefficiently” when such time is in108
cluded in the initial lodestar calculation.

partments is the use of alternative fee arrangements” and finding arrangements based on
“value-based fees, which are based on the type of work performed and the value it has to the
client, rather than a strict hourly measure” among the most common alternatives); Law Firm
A M.
LAWYER,
http://www.law.com/jsp/
Leaders
Survey
2009:
Billing,
THE
tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202435770978 (providing data on “all firms,” in addition to firms in
New York, Washington DC, and Chicago, and finding that of those firms using value-based billing, the overwhelming majority did so because clients requested it and the firms suggested it). In
response to the question “approximately what percentage of your matters included a valuebased/nonhourly fee component?” firms in the Law Firm Leaders Survey 2009 responded as follows: All firms (fourteen percent); New York (nineteen percent); Washington DC (ten percent);
Chicago (eleven percent). Id.
105. Interview with Neil Williams, supra note 102. Williams noted that standard billing practices will likely be modified due to increasing competitive pressures in the private legal sector
and the need for budget and expense control in the corporate world.
106. Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 13. Justice Ginsburg touched
upon the limited circumstances in which lodestar adjustments are made when she asked Mr.
Shah, amicus for the defendants/petitioners, how it is that a judge can adjust downward for poor
performance, but should not be allowed enhance the award for a superior performance. Mr.
Shah, who agreed that judges should be permitted to adjust downward for poor performance,
cabined his response by explaining that the situations in which this adjusting occurs should be
quite limited. Mr. Shah’s response supports the respondents’ argument that enhancements, like
reductions, should be permitted by the courts, but limited in their application. Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 20–21; see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)
(“There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may
attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award
to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable
judgment.”).
107. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 2, at 23 (explaining that in the past seventeen years,
attorneys in sixty-seven federal cases have requested upward adjustments, but only nine enhancements have survived appeal).
108. LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 922; Brief of Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39,
at 13 (recognizing that “it is not unusual for courts to reduce a lawyer’s actual market rate . . .
before calculating the lodestar”). The district judge’s decision to reduce the requested lodestar
by sixteen percent in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue exemplifies the discretion judges exercise
when making fee determinations. 454 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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VI. ARGUMENTS/DISPOSITION
Though the question presented to the Supreme Court isolated the
quality of performance and results obtained as the factors at issue in
Perdue, the Justices’ questions at oral argument suggested that what
most concerns the Court is whether enhancements of the lodestar, in
109
general, are ever permissible. Because a majority of the Court
seemed greatly perturbed by the possibility of exorbitant legal fees,
the Court will probably reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and
tailor its ruling to find that the disputed factors are already ade110
quately accounted for in the lodestar calculation. In doing so, the
Court will severely narrow the scope of attorneys’ fee awards under
federal fee-shifting statutes.
A. Redundant Compensation
The Supreme Court has eliminated possible justifications for fee
enhancements point-by-point over the years, but one constant has
remained—an emphasis on specific findings that support a court’s decision that some particular factor was not adequately accounted for in
111
the lodestar. Indeed, the main reason the Eleventh Circuit remanded NAACP and Norman was because the district courts failed to
correlate their decisions denying enhancement with specific reasons
109. When discussing a hypothetical fee award during oral arguments, Justice Breyer commented “I am tempted to think: Well, very high is enough. You don’t need very, very, very
high” and expressed his concern that average people would not be able to understand “very,
very, very high” fee awards. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 35. Justice Alito
noted that unlike a “private litigation where the money is coming out of the pocket of the corporation,” here “[i]t’s coming out of the pocket of taxpayers [and] that is very troubling.” Id. at
28.
110. See Tony Mauro, High Court Justices Doubt Lawyers Should Be Paid Extra for Winning, Nat’l L.J., Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/ jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434599147
(noting that during oral arguments the “[J]ustices seemed more worried about high legal fees
than in encouraging quality lawyers to do public-minded work”); see also Street, supra note 7
(“Both points have flaws . . . [b]ut the oral argument showed that the children have greater
problems to contend with.”); Robert Barnes, Justices Weigh $4.5 Million Bonus Awarded Lawyers in Ga. Litigation: Judge was Impressed by Attorneys’ Work on Foster-Care Case, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/10/14/AR2009101403768.html (“Although the winning lawyers in the case are supported . . . by an array of liberal and conservative public interest groups . . . the reaction of the
justices seemed to divide into ideological camps.”).
111. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437–38 (1983) (emphasizing the importance of
clear findings that consider the “relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the
results obtained” in order for an enhancement to be justified). The Hensley Court reversed the
lower court’s decision because it held that it did not adequately answer the question of why the
award was in fact “reasonable.” Id. See also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 889 (1984) (vacating
the district court’s enhancement for a failure to adequately justify it).
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113

for the compensation awarded. Drawing on prior similar cases, the
Court may choose to reverse the fee, finding that the district court in
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue failed to justify its conclusion with a
proper rationale for enhancing the fee award.
The district court’s decision to award an enhancement was justified partially because the settlement vindicated the civil rights of so
114
many individuals. In Blum, for example, the district court had justi115
fied its enhancement, in part, for the same reason. But, the Supreme
Court found that the enhancement was unreasonable because the district court had not explained “exactly how this determination affected
the fee award, . . . [and because] record evidence [failed to] show[]
that the benefit achieved require[d] an upward adjustment to the
116
fee.”
The district court’s other reasons for supporting a fee enhancement included the attorneys’ advancement of case expenses, lack of
payment on an on-going basis, and the contingency of success in the
case. Each of these justifications have also been addressed in prior
Court cases and been found not to merit enhancements as they are
117
presumably adequately accounted for in the lodestar or strictly pro118
hibited as a justification for enhancement. At oral argument, the
112. See NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding the
district court’s award, which did not include an enhancement, unfounded without findings justifying its decision not to do so); Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1302, 1306 (11th Cir.
1988) (remanding in part because the court “applied the wrong standard”).
113. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II), 483 U.S. 711 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air (Delaware Valley I), 478 U.S. 546 (1986); Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886 (1984). None of these cases explicitly precluded fee enhancements, but, for various,
related reasons, reversed fee enhancements by the lower courts.
114. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1230 (11th Cir. 2008).
115. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898. In Blum, the respondents argued that a fee enhancement was
merited in part because the “results were of far-reaching significance to a large class of people.”
One of the reasons the district court awarded the enhancement, it stated, was because of the
“great benefit” the case brought to the plaintiff class. The Supreme Court, however, held that
this reasoning alone did not merit a fee enhancement. Id.
116. Id. at 900. The Blum Court’s opinion also emphasized that nothing in the record suggested that the fee, unadjusted, would be unreasonable. Id. at 898. In addition, the Blum Court
noted that the winning litigants did “not claim, or even mention, entitlement to a bonus or upward revision” in their affidavits. Id.
117. See Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564 (explaining that although Johnson factors may
be considered when determining whether a fee should be adjusted, they are usually “subsumed
within the initial calculation”). Each of the district court’s reasons could potentially be recognized as fitting under one of the twelve factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).
118. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 567 (holding enhancement based on contingency is not permitted).
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Justices expressed concern as to what enhanced compensation would
119
actually compensate for outside of the lodestar calculation. The
Court could find that attorneys’ hourly rates and the amount of time
they spend on a matter inherently subsume all the considerations that
lower courts have previously identified as independent of the basic
lodestar calculation and therefore do not justify an adjustment. If the
Supreme Court finds this to be the case, it could logically conclude
that fee enhancements are improper because they result in doublecounting.
B. A Preference for “Simple” Calculations
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments for the defendants’ attorneys is the seemingly unbounded discretion afforded to the lower
courts if the district court’s decision is affirmed. During oral arguments Justice Alito lamented that enhancements have introduced
120
complications into otherwise straightforward fee calculations. If the
Court rules that all the Johnson factors are already subsumed within
the lodestar, then it becomes that much more difficult to determine
121
what else could possibly justify the award of additional monies. If
the Supreme Court decides that attorney fee awards under section
1988 ought be determined solely by multiplying the number of hours
expended by a reasonable rate, this may indeed simplify the figures
that go into determining a reasonable fee and address the Court’s
concern regarding the possibility of “second major litigation[s]” over
122
attorneys’ fees.
119. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 30–32 (comment of Chief Justice
Roberts) (“I don’t understand the concept of extraordinary success or results obtained. The results that are obtained are presumably the results that are dictated or command[ed] or required
under the law. And it’s not like, well, you had a really good attorney, so I’m going to say the law
means this, which gives you a lot more, but if you had a bad attorney I would say the law has
this and so he doesn’t get a multiplier. The results obtained under our theory should be what the
law requires, and not different results because you have different lawyers.”).
120. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 27–28 (comment of Justice Alito)
(pointing out that the “great advantage in doing things mechanically” is that “it provides an
element of fairness,” and noting that “what troubles me about” the district court’s method is
that “it seems totally standardless, and I see no way of policing it . . . I see a great danger”).
121. Street, supra note 7 (“If a majority of the Justices do not believe that argument, it is difficult to see how they can overlook their other concerns and give district judges discretion to
enhance fee awards based on the amorphous concepts of results obtained and quality of performance without guaranteeing years of future litigation that could drain state governments of
even more money.”).
122. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 566 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
Although contingency is no longer a basis for enhancement, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Dague
highlights the Court’s interest in not fomenting litigation after a case has ended. Justice Scalia
stated that an “interest in ready administrability” and “the related interest in avoiding burden-
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The Supreme Court’s distaste for case-specific adjudications may
overshadow any desire to compensate based on the actual value real123
ized in an individual case. As evidenced during oral arguments, Justice Scalia voiced his concern that the district court’s enhancement
was more an exercise in random judicial decision-making than
124
thoughtful, discretionary adjudication. But, the extent to which a
judge’s decision to enhance a fee award can be deemed “random” will
also call into question many other relatively discretionary determinations a judge regularly makes with only a reasonableness standard to
125
guide his decision. If the Supreme Court holds that the district
court’s award here was unreasonable, it will likely recalculate the fee
126
award using the basic lodestar calculation, which may signal that the
Court finds itself no longer capable or willing to square judicial discretion with calculating a “reasonable attorney’s fee.”
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court’s many decisions striking down fee enhancements, if it decides to follow suit in Perdue, the Court may soon
see a noticeable drop in the number of civil rights cases litigated as
economically rational lawyers decide to leave such cases to lawyers
some satellite litigation” underlay the Court’s adoption of the lodestar approach. Id. at 566.
123. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989) (“When I was in law school, I was a great enthusiast for . . . reading the ‘holding’ of a decision narrowly, thereby leaving greater discretion to future courts. Over the years, however . . .
I have found myself drawn more and more to the opposite view.”). Scalia further noted that
“[t]he trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not
satisfy [the sense of justice as proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause] . . . . Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what is prescribes.”
Id. at 1178–79.
124. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 38–39 (comment of Justice Scalia). To
further his point that fee enhancements might be regarded as arbitrary, Justice Scalia explained
that it seemed to him that if a new judge was on the bench, then attorneys litigating in an
equally meritorious fashion to those in Perdue could very well not receive a fee enhancement
simply because their judge might lack the experience to identify whether this is some of the best
lawyering he or she might ever witness. Justice Scalia commented that you, a lawyer before a
first time appointment to the bench, would have to “kiss good-bye to your . . . extra money for
being excellent.” Id.
125. For example, the reasonableness standard guides judicial determinations of general
remedy-crafting, punitive damage awards, criminal sentencing, and accommodations made for
religion under Title VII and disabled persons under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
126. During oral arguments, Justice Breyer calculated that if one were to break down the
post-enhancement award in Perdue it would be equivalent to an attorney charging approximately $350 per hour. He addressed how this amount, multiplied by 2000 billable hours, would
result in compensation totaling $700,000 per year for the particular attorney. He responded to
his own hypothetical with a “wow!” and conveyed concern about the size of such an award.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 33–34.
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whose jobs regularly involve handling such matters. If, however, the
Court decides it ought to follow market trends and award attorneys
based on the value of the work they provide to their clients, then the
number of those interested in bringing meritorious claims covered by
the fee-shifting statutes may rise because pursing cases covered by
section 1988 would be comparably lucrative to pursuing cases in the
private-sector. Though rejecting the enhancement in Perdue may allow for fee determinations that seem straightforward, determining
appropriate hourly rates in the relevant legal market and a reasonable
number of hours may be as much an exercise in judicial discretion as
the alternative. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, often prefers to rely
on traditional standards and seemingly clear lines, which may seem at
odds with a ruling that encourages judges to award fees based upon
considerations other than the number of hours worked at a prescribed
rate. Eliminating an aspect of decisionmaking in which judges might
seem untethered to clear guidelines and standards could prove very
alluring to the Supreme Court when it hands down its decision later
this term.

127. See Brief for Law and Economics Scholars, supra note 39, at 13 (predicting that lawyers
of “sufficient skill and experience” will not take cases falling under section 1988 if there is no
longer the possibility of enhancement).

